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Abstract
For the classical backward induction algorithm, the input is an arbitrary n-person positional game with perfect in-
formation modeled by a finite acyclic directed graph (digraph) and the output is a profile (x1, . . . , xn) of pure positional
strategies that form some special subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend this algorithm to work with digraphs
that may have directed cycles. Each digraph admits a unique partition into strongly connected components, which will
be treated as the outcomes of the game. Such a game will be called a deterministic graphical multistage(DGMS) game.
If we identify the outcomes corresponding to all strongly connected components, except terminal positions, we obtain the
so-called deterministic graphical(DG) games, which are frequent in the literature. The outcomes of a DG game are all
terminal positions and one special outcome c that is assigned to all infinite plays. We modify the backward induction pro-
cedure to adapt it for the DGMS games. However, by doing so, we lose two important properties: the modified algorithm
always outputs a Nash equilibrium (NE) only when n = 2 and, even in this case, this NE may be not subgame perfect.
(Yet, in the zero-sum case it is.) The lack of these two properties is not a fault of the algorithm, just (subgame perfect)
Nash equilibria in pure positional strategies may fail to exist in the considered game.
Keywords: deterministic graphical (multistage) game, game in normal and in positional form, saddle point, Nash
equilibrium, Nash-solvability, game form, positional structure, directed graph, digraph, directed cycle, acyclic digraph.
1 Introduction
The most natural think to do in the presence of potentially infinite play seems to be to simply permit it...
Alan Washburn [32]
and, even better, to make a typical play infinite.
1.1 Decomposing digraphs into strongly connected components
Let G = (V,E) be a finite directed graph (digraph) that may have parallel edges, directed oppositely or similarly, and loops,
but at most one at each vertex. Digraph G is called strongly connected if for any v, v′ ∈ V there is a directed path from v to
v′ (and, hence, from v′ to v, as well). By this definition, the union of two strongly connected digraphs is strongly connected
whenever they have a common vertex. A vertex-inclusion-maximal strongly connected induced subgraph of G is called its
strongly connected component. Obviously, any digraph G = (V,E) admits a unique decomposition into such components:
Gj = G[V j ] = (V j , Ej) for j ∈ J , where J is a set of indices and V = ∪j∈JV j is a partition of V , that is, V j ∩ V j
′
= ∅
whenever j 6= j′ for a pair j, j′ ∈ J . This partition can be determined in time linear in the size of G (that is, in (|V |+ |E|))
and has numerous applications; see [30] and [29] for more details. Here we suggest one more application, to positional games.
Let VT ⊆ V denote the set of all terminal vertices (or terminals, for short); more precisely, v ∈ VT if and only if there is no
edge from v, except, perhaps, a loop ev = (v, v). Any such vertex forms a maximal connected component, that is, {v} = V j
for some j ∈ J ; denote by JT the corresponding subset of J . For convenience, let us add a loop ev to each v ∈ VT that does
not have one yet. All loops in VT , old and new, will be called terminal loops and all v ∈ VT will be still called terminals.
The concepts of a directed path and a directed cycle (dicycle) are defined standardly; see, for example, [30] and [29]. An
edge is a directed path of length 1; a loop is a dicycle of length 1, a dicycle of length 2 is a pair of parallel oppositely directed
edges, a dicycle of length |V | is called Hamiltonian, A digraph without dicycles is called acyclic.
Let J0 denote the subset of J such that V
j is a single vertex with no loop it it. Obviously, Gj contains a dicycle unless
j ∈ J0. By our convention, JT ∩ J0 = ∅.
For each j ∈ J , let us contract Gj into a single vertex vj . Then, all edges of Ej (in particular, the loops) disappear and
we obtain an acyclic digraph G∗ = (V ∗, E∗).
In case of the standard backward induction we have G∗ = G or, equivalently, J = J0 ∪ JT is a partition of J .
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1.2 Modeling positional games by digraphs
Given an arbitrary digraph G = (V,E), we interpret it as a positional structure in which V and E are positions and moves,
respectively. Furthermore, let us fix a partition V = V1 ∪ . . .∪ Vn ∪ VT in which Vi are the sets of positions controlled by the
players i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, while VT is the set of all terminals.
The considered model is restricted to the games with perfect information and without moves of chance. Also, we restrict
the players i ∈ I to their pure and positional (also called stationary strategies Xi. Such a strategy xi ∈ Xi assigns a move
(v, v′) ∈ E to every v ∈ Vi. Given an initial position v0 ∈ V \VT , each strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) uniquely defines a walk
in G that begins in v0 and in each position follows the move chosen be the corresponding strategy. Since all strategies are
positional, this walk forms a “lasso”, that is, it consists of an initial directed path and a dicycle repeated infinitely. For every
j ∈ J \ J0, let us identify all lassos whose dicycles belong to Gj and treat them as a single outcome cj of the game. Then,
A = {cj | j ∈ J \J0} is the set of outcomes. An outcome is called a terminal whenever Gj is a terminal loop. Thus, we obtain
a game form g :
∏
i∈I Xi → A. Positional structures, game forms, and games defined above will be called Deterministic
Graphical Multistage (DGMS) ones.
Let us identify the outcomes cj for all j ∈ J \ JT and denote the obtained new outcome c; it is assigned to each dicycle,
or in other words, to every infinite play, in G. As before, the terminal loops form distinct outcomes. The corresponding
positional structures, game forms, and games are called Deterministic Graphical ones. They were introduced by Washburn
[32] in 1990 and since then are frequent in the literature; see, for example, [32], [10], [4], [6, Section 12], [5], [1], [2], [7], [19].
Only two-person zero-sum DG games were considered in [32], [10], [2], while our main results are related to the two-person,
but not necessarily zero-sum, DGMS games.
Note also that DG games are simpler than DGMS games, since identification of any outcomes respects the properties of
solvability, which we study here. Thus, “DGMS games” could be an alternative title for this paper.
1.3 Nash equillibria and solvability of game forms
Given an arbitrary, not necessarily DG or DGMS, game form g : X → A, where X =
∏
i∈I Xi, let us introduce a utility
function u : I × A → R. Here the real number u(i, o) is interpreted as a profit of the player i ∈ I in case of the outcome
a ∈ A. A pare (g, u) is called a (normal form) game.
A strategy profile x = (xi | i ∈ I) ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if u(i, g(x)) ≥ u(i, g(x′)) for every x′ ∈ X
that differs from x only in the coordinate i; or in other words, if no player can strictly improve by replacing his/her strategy
provided all others keep their strategies unchanged. This concept was suggested by Nash in [26] and [27].
If n = |I| = 2 then g, u, and (g, u) are called a two-person game form, utility function, and game, respectively. Furthermore,
u and (g, u) are called zero-sum utility function and game, respectively, if u(1, a) + u(2, a) = 1 for every outcome a ∈ A. In
this case a NE is usually referred to as a saddle point. Finally, u and (g, u) are called win/lose utility function and game,
respectively, if u is zero-sum and takes only values +1 and −1.
A game form g is called
• (S1) Nash-solvable (NS) if game (g, u) has a NE (in pure strategies) for any u;
• (S2) zero-sum-solvable if n = 2 and (g, u) has a saddle point for every zero-sum u;
• (S3) win/lose-solvable if n = 2 and (g, u) has a saddle point for every win/lose u.
Theorem 1 ([16]). For the two-person game forms the above three properties are equivalent.
A two-person game form satisfying these properties will be called just solvable, since no specification NS, zero-sum, or
win/lose is needed.
Implications (S1)⇒ (S2)⇒ (S3) are immediate from the above definitions. For the two-person zero-sum case, equivalence
(S2) and (S3) was proven by Edmonds and Fulkerson (who called it the “Bottle-Neck Extrema Theorem”) in [12] and later,
independently, in [15]. Then implication (S3) ⇒ (S1) was proven in [16]. The same proof was repeated in a more focused
paper [17]; see also [28].
The proof is constructive: a NE in the game (g, u) is obtained by an explicit algorithm whenever the game form g is NS.
Unfortunately, this algorithm is exponential in the size of A.
1.4 Main results. DG, DGMS, and other solvable game forms
Another proof, based on a polynomial algorithm, appeared later; see [18, Section 4.3], [4, Section 3], and the recent preprint
[20]. Some new ideas from [3] and [11] were used in this proof. For convenience of the reader, in Section 2.1 we will prove
constructively a slightly stronger statement.
Proposition 1 Implication (S3)⇒ (S1) holds for the two-person game forms. Moreover, to get a NE in a two-person game
(g, u) with a solvable game form g and arbitrary u : {1, 2} × A → R we need to solve at most 2|A| win/lose games with the
same game form g.
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Complexity of the latter problem depends on the considered class of game forms. We know several classes for which the
win/lose games can be solved efficiently.
Monotone bargaining was studied recently in [20], where it was shown that all considered game forms are NS and the
corresponding ±1 games are solvable in linear time by a very simple greedy algorithm.
Two-person positional game structures in which distinct dicycles form distinct outcomes were considered in [6]. In this
case only some special game forms are solvable. They were characterized in [6], however, not in general, but only in case of
the so-called symmetric digraphs. (G = (V,E) is called symmetric if (v, v′) ∈ E whenever (v′, v) ∈ E). Again the win/lose
games are solvable in linear time [6, Theorem 5].
We will derive solvability results for DGMS game forms from the corresponding results for DG game forms. The latter are
known. The two-person zero-sum DG games were introduced in [32]. For their pre-history, history, algorithms of solution,
and their complexity, we refer the reader to the short but comprehensive survey [2].
Every win/lose DG game has a subgame perfect NE (saddlle point) in pure positional strategies, which can be found in
linear time in the size of G, that is, |V |+ |E|. This result was obtained in 1992 by Condon [10]. In fact, the same algorithm
was discovered earlier, in 1986, by Thompson [31] and presented to the artificial intelligence community, under the name of
retrograde analysis; see [2] for more details..
Applying theorem 1, we conclude that the two-person DG game forms are NS, which is also known: [4, Section 3], [5],
[6, Section 12]. By backward induction, we will extend this result from DG to DGMS case, and prove in Section 2.2 the
following statement.
Proposition 2 The two-person DGMS game forms are NS and the corresponding win/lose games can be solved in linear
time.
Let us notice again that the obtained NE may be not subgame perfect, but in the zero-sum case it is. To extend this
result to the DGMS games, we use some known results on the subgame perfect saddle points of the two-person zero-sum DG
games, which are of independent interest.
In fact, a DG game can be viewed as a (very special case of a) mean-payoff stochastic game with perfect information.
Indeed, we can set the local rewards r(i, e) = 0 for all i ∈ I and all einE, except for the terminal loops ev = (v, v), for which
the values of r(i, ev) can be arbitrary. Thus, the existence of a subgame perfect saddle point in every zero-sum DG game
follows from a much more general (and old, 1957) result of Gillette [14] claiming the same property for the stochastic games
with perfect information. (Gillette’s proof, based on the Hardy-Littlewood Theorem [22] of 1931, had a flaw; conditions of
the theorem were not accurately verified. It was corrected in 1969 by Liggett and Lippman [25].)
An “almost linear” algorithm was suggested in [2, Sections 3]. It outputs a subgame perfect saddle point in time
|E| + |A| log |A|) and requires sorting of the outcomes, that is, |A| log |A| comparisons. Given a permutation ordering the
terminals, the problem becomes linear.
We extend the above results from DG to DGMS games, combining the known DG algorithms with backward induction,
and prove in Section 2.2 the following statement.
Proposition 3 A subgame perfect saddle point in a two-person zero-sum DGMS game can be found in time linear in (|E|+
|V |+ |A| log |A|) and in linear time if the outcomes are sorted in advance.
As we already mentioned, one obtains a DGMS game from a DG one, identifying the outcomes cj for all j ∈ J \ (J0∪JT ).
Obviously, any identification of outcomes respects solvability.
1.5 Modifying Backward induction
The backward induction algorithm was developed for n-person games with perfect information by Gale [13] and Kuhn [24];
see also [23]. The authors model games by arborescence (directed rooted trees) but an extension to arbitrary acyclic digraphs
is straightforward. Moreover, positions of chance can be easily included into consideration too [13]. The algorithm constructs,
in linear time, some special subgame perfect NE in pure positional strategies.
However, the acyclicity is very essential. In Section 2.2 we modify the backward induction procedure to allow it to work
in presence of dicycles, but for this we have to pay a price: the modified backward induction works only in the two-person
case and the obtained NE may be not subgame perfect.
First, we introduce the new procedure for the win/lose games. Yet, we want to construct a NE for an arbitrary (not
necessarily zero-sum) two-person game, and we will, but the algorithm becomes more sophisticated. It calls at most 2|A|
times for solving some specially chosen win/lose games. A constructive proof based on Theorem 1 and Propositions 1 and 2
will be given in Section 2. We always obtain a NE but it may be not subgame perfect, although in the zero-sum case it is.
These above two flaws is not a fault of the algorithm. Just NE may fail to exist when n > 2. First such example, with
n = 4, was constructed in [19]; then, a much smaller one, with n = 3, was given in [8]; see Section 3 for more details. The
main result of the present paper implies that n cannot be reduced further, that is, NS holds for n = 2. Yet, a subgame
perfect NE may fail to exist even in this case. First such example was given in [1, Section 6.2, Figure 10]; more complicated
examples having some extra properties can be found in [7] and [21]; see Section 1.6 for more details.
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1.6 Interpretation
Members of a household I = {1, . . . , n} have to delegate somebody to perform a necessary (but, perhaps, not very pleasant)
job, like weekly shopping or cleaning the house. We model the game by a digraph G = (V,E) such that
V = {v1, . . . , vn; t1, . . . , tn}, E = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vn−1, vn), (vn, v1); (v1, t1), . . . , (vn, tn)}.
We also add a terminal loop ci in ti for every i ∈ I. Digraph G has n+ 1 strongly connected components: n terminal loops
and one n-dicycle. Thus, G∗ is the directed star with n rays. Each player i ∈ I controls only one position, vi, and has only
two possible moves in it; in other words, (s)he has two strategies: either to proceed along the n-dicycle or terminate in ci.
The latter means that (s)he accepts the job. If no player does, then the job remains undone, negotiations come to a dead-end
and the play, in contrast, results in the long dicycle. The corresponding outcome is c0 and A = {c0, c1, . . . , cn} is the set of
all outcomes. A utility function u : I × A → R may be arbitrary. It would be natural to assume that u(i, ci) < u(i, cj) for
any distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, but even this is not required.
For n = 2 and n = 3 this example was analyzed in [1, Section 6.2] and [4], respectively; see also [7] and [8, Remark3]. It
was demonstrated that a subgame perfect NE may fail to exist in both cases, yet, with respect to any fixed initial position,
it exists. However, this property may fail too. First NE free example, with n = 4, was constructed in [19]; then, a smaller
one, with n = 3, in [8]. The main result of the present paper implies that n cannot be reduced further.
In general, the acyclic digraph G∗, as well as the strongly connected components of G may have more complicated
structure; see, for example, [4]. Every strongly connected component Gj can be interpreted as a diplomatic issue. (The
level may not be very high, as the previous example shows.) If this issue is resolved, the play leaves Gj , enters another
connected component, and the parties (players) proceed with the negotiation process. Otherwise, the play cycles in Gj and
negotiations terminate resulting in the outcome cj. We assume that it only matters at what issue (a strongly connected
component Gj) the parties have been forced into an impasse, while details (a particular lasso, or a dicycle in which it ends
in Gj) are irrelevant. Thus, an DGMS game is interpreted as a multistage diplomacy. Then, the main result shows that the
corresponding DGMS game form is NS; furthermore, for any u a NE in the game (g, u) can be found in linear time, in other
words, any bilateral multistage diplomatic conflict can be efficiently resolved and the resolving strategies can be efficiently
determined.
2 Proofs
2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let standardly I = {1, . . . , n} and A = {a1, . . . , ap} denote the sets of the players and outcomes, respectively. We assume
that n = 2 and prove that any two-person win/lose-solvable game form g : X1 ×X2 → A is NS. The proof is constructive,
for any utility function u : I ×A→ R we will find a NE in the obtained game (g, u) in at most 2p steps in each of which we
solve a win/lose game specified by a partition A = A1 ∪ A2, where A1 and A2 denote the sets of outcomes winning for the
players 1 and 2, respectively.
It will be convenient to replace u by two utility functions, u = (u1, u2), u1 : A→ R, u2 : A→ R, of the first and second
player, respectively. Let us consider a partition A =W ∪W1 ∪W2 satisfying the following properties:
• (a1) any outcome of W1 is not better for player 1 than any outcome of W , that is, u1(a′) ≤ u1(a) for any a ∈ W and
a′ ∈W1;
• (a2) any outcome of W2 is not better for player 2 than any outcome of W , that is, u2(a′) ≤ u2(a) for any a ∈ W and
a′ ∈W2;
• (b1) player 1 cannot win (the win/lose game) with A1 = W2, that is, 1 cannot punish 2;
• (b2) player 2 cannot win (the win/lose game) with A2 = W1, that is, 2 cannot punish 1.
In general, it is not possible that both players win, but it is possible that both cannot win. However, we assume that the
game form g is win/lose-solvable, that is, a player wins whenever the opponent cannot.
Our proof will be “dynamical”. We begin with W = A and reduce W sending outcomes to W1 and to W2 and verifying
that all four above conditions always hold. In the beginning, W = A, W1 = W2 = ∅, this is the case. Let us show that W
cannot be eliminated completely. Indeed, suppose that W = ∅ and, hence, A = W1∪W2 is a partition. Then, (b1), (b2), and
win/lose-solvability imply that both players win the game with A1 = W2 and A2 = W1, which is impossible. Thus, reducing
W must get stuck at some point, say, at a partition A = W ∪W1 ∪W2.
Let a∗ ∈ A be the worst outcome in W for player 1, that is, u1(a
∗) ≤ u1(a) for each a ∈ W . We would like to move
a∗ from W to W1 but cannot. The only possible reason is that (b2) will be violated, that is, 2 can win the game with
A2 =W1 ∪ {a∗}. Denote by x2 a winning strategy.
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Moving a∗ alone from to W to W2 may violate (a2). To keep it, we have to add to a
∗ all outcomes W2(a
∗) ⊆W that are
not better than a∗ for 2, that is, u2(a
∗) ≥ u2(a) for all a ∈ W2(a∗); in particular, a∗ ∈ W2(a∗). Then, moving W2(a∗) from
W to W2 is OK with (a2), but still cannot be done. The only possible reason is that (b1) will be violated, that is, 1 can win
the game with A1 = W2 ∪W2(a∗)). Denote by x1 a winning strategy.
By construction, g(x1, x2) = {a
∗} = (W1 ∪ {a
∗}) ∩ (W2 ∪W2(a
∗)). and (x1, x2) is a NE.
By each step, we are trying to send at least one outcome either to W1 or to W2 and solve the obtained win/lose game to
verify whether such sending can be realized. Thus, totally, we will have to solve at most 2p win/lose games. 
Remark 1 The obtained NE is simple, that is, g(x1) ∩ g(x2) = {a∗}, where g(x1) = ∪x2g(x1, x2) and g(x2) = ∪x1g(x1, x2).
This property is important in applications; see, for example, [20].
2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider a two-person positional structure defined by a digraph G = (V,E) and a partition V = V1 ∪V2 ∪VT . Then, a
win/lose game is defined by an arbitrary partition A = {cj | j ∈ J \ J0} = A1 ∪A2 of the set of outcomes A into the winning
sets of players 1 and 2.
We suggest an algorithm that finds, for a win/lose game, in time linear in |V |, a pair of (pure stationary) strategies
(x1, x2) that form a subgame perfect saddle point.
Remark 2 Recall that no subgame perfect NE may not exist when the payoff function is not zero-sum; see the example of
[1, Section 6.2]. Nevertheless, win/lose-solvability implies NS, although the corresponding NE can be chosen subgame perfect
only in the first case.
We will combine solving zero-sum DG gasmes with backward induction. Recall that G∗ is a finite acyclic digraph whose
vertices j ∈ J correspond to the strongly connected components Gj of G. Hence, G∗ must have a terminal vertex. The
corresponding Gj = (V j , Ej) may be a terminal loop, j ∈ JT , but it may also be a non-trivial component, with several
vertices in it. In this case, the same player wins with respect to every initial position v0 ∈ V j : player 1 wins if cj ∈ A1 and
2 if cj ∈ A2. In both cases we eliminate all edges of Ej and add a terminal loop to each vertex of V j that did not have any
yet. Thus, we can get rid of all terminal components Gj such that j ∈ J \ (J0 ∪ JT ), just increasing the number of terminal
loops.
Although our algorithm modifies the original digraph G many times, yet, for simplicity, we will keep the notation.
Now let us choose a j ∈ J \ (J0 ∪ JT ) such that component Gj = (V j , Ej) is not terminal, but any edge that leaves V j
enters a terminal loop. More precisely, for any edge e = (v, v′) ∈ E such that v ∈ V j there is a terminal loop ev′ = (v′, v′).
Note that loop ev = (v, v) may exist but cannot be terminal.
We have to consider two cases: cj ∈ A1 and cj ∈ A2. Let us assume that cj ∈ A1 and find the subset W ⊆ V j such that
player 2 wins whenever v0 ∈W , that is, (s)he can enforce a terminal loop from A2. Set W can be constructed by a standard
recursive procedure. We start with k = 0 and set W 0 of all terminal loops from A2. Then, for k = 0, 1, . . . we extend W
k
adding to it each vertex v ∈ V j \W k such that
• (i) every move (v, v′) ∈ E enters W k if v ∈ V1, or
• (ii) there is a move (v, v′) ∈ E that enters W k if v ∈ V2.
We proceed until no vertex is added to W k
∗
and then set W k
∗
=W . By construction, player 2 wins whenever v0 ∈W . The
winning strategy x2 is defined by the following rule: stay in W moving from W
k to W k−1, which is always possible, by (ii).
Then, sooner or later, the play will end in W 0.
Conversely, player 1 wins whenever v0 ∈ V
j \W . The winning strategy x1 is defined by the following rule: choose any
move that does not enter W , which is always possible, by (i). Then, sooner or later, the play will realize either a terminal
loop from A1, or a dicycle of G
j . By our assumption, cj ∈ A1 too, hence, player 1 wins in both cases.
If we assume that cj ∈ A2 then the roles of players 1 and 2 swap, otherwise the procedure remains the same.
Remark 3 The roles of the players differ in each case: one who does not like cj wins only if (s)he enforces a winning
terminal loop, while for the other one, who likes cj, this is not necessary, it is enough just to stay in G
j.
The considered win/lose game is solved whenever v0 ∈ V j . Eliminate all edges going from each vertex v ∈ V j and add a
terminal loop ev = (v, v) to it. Set ev ∈ A2 whenever v ∈ W and ev ∈ A1 otherwise.
In all above cases, we modified our win/lose game by eliminating Gj and replacing it by terminal loops. The number
of the strongly connected components of G distinct from the terminal loops is reduced by one. Then, we repeat the whole
procedure. In |J | − |J0|) steps the game will be solved with respect to all v0 ∈ V . 
Remark 4 By construction, the obtained NE in the considered win/lose game is subgame perfect. In contrast, the original
game (g, u) may have no subgame perfect NE at all; see examples in [1, Figure 6] and [7].
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2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a a two-person zero-sum DGMS game modeled by a digraph G. The proof follows the same line as the proof
of Proposition 2 until we start to analyze a component Gj = (V j , Ej) from which every move comes to a terminal loop.
Obviously, this is a BD subgame and, according to [2], it has a subgame perfect saddle point than can be determined in
“almost linear” time (|Ej | + |Vj | + |Aj | log |Aj |), where Aj is the set of terminal loops reachable from Vj . These strategies
defined on V j will be extended by backward induction to the whole vertex-set V .
As before, we eliminate all edges beginning in V j and add to each v ∈ V j the terminal loop ev assigning to it the value
obtained for the subgame. Then, we choose the next component Gj and repeat the whole procedure. In |J | − |J0|) steps the
game will be solved with respect to all v0 ∈ V . It is not difficult to see that, by construction, we obtain a subgame perfect
saddle point. As for complexity, the “almost linear” bound of [2] still holds, since for Gj the algorithm is the same and the
backward induction works for all j ∈ J in linear time. Thus, the worst case is |J \ (J0∪JT )| = 1 corresponding to DG games.
3 Open questions
As before, let n and p denote the numbers of players and terminals (or, what is the same, terminal loops), and let ℓ be the
length of the longest directed path in G∗. In the present paper we proved that NS holds for n = 2.
Yet, NS may fail to exist when n > 2. A three-person NE free example is given in [8, Figure 1]. This example is
pretty compact: p = ℓ = 3; in addition to three terminal loops, it contains only one dicycle (of length 2) and two positions
approaching it. Note that each of them is a strongly connected component. Only one player controls two positions, while
other two control a unique position each.
One can easily reduce ℓ = 3 to 2 without creating a NE. Consider the move (1, 2) in [8, Figure 1] and add to it the
return (2, 1). Clearly, for the obtained digraph G′ we have ℓ′ = 2. Furthermore, by adding (2, 1) we create the second dicycle
c′ = ((1, 2), (2, 1)), which becomes the fifth outcome, in addition to terminals a1, a2, a3, and dicycle c = ((3, 2), (2, 3)). We
leave for the reader to verify that no NE will appear, even if we identify c′ with c.
The example given in [19] was larger: n = ℓ = 4, p = 5, it also has a unique dicycle (of length 5) and three positions
approaching it.
It remains open whether NS results from any of the following four assumptions:
• (A1) ℓ = 1;
• (A2) p ≤ 2;
• (A3) each player controls a unique position (so-called play-once case);
• (A4) each terminal loop is better than any other dicycle for every player?
The last three questions were considered before, but only for the DG games. Let us introduce such an assumption:
(A0) All dicycles form a single outcome c.
NS results from (((A2), (A4), and (A0)) or ((A3), (A4) and (A0)). Both implications follow from the results of [4]. Note
that assuming (A2) and (A4) we can also assume, without loss of generality, that n ≤ 2 and then, NS follows, by Theorem 1.
In the preprint [9], the authors replaced (A2), p ≤ 2, in ((A2), (A4), and (A0)) by a weaker assumption, p ≤ 3, and
derived NS. However, they found an irreparable flaw in their proof and, thus, the implication remains open.
In theory of stochastic games different types of additive costs are considered. Let r : I × E → R be a local cost function:
each player i ∈ I has to pay the amount r(i, e) whenever the directed edge e ∈ E is chosen as a move by a player. Let us
also assume
(A5) the local cost function r takes only strictly positive values.
Note that (A4) follows from (A5). Now, we do not introduce terminal loops. If a play P comes to a terminal, we define the
effective cost of P for each player i ∈ I as the sum of all local costs for all edges of the play, that is, U(i, P ) =
∑
e∈P r(i, e).
If P is a lasso then U(i, P ) = +∞ for all i ∈ I. All players minimize their effective costs.
The main result of [4] states that in this case NS follows from (A3).
Conjecture 2 In the two-person case, (A5) implies NS.
A NE free example for n = 3, and for n = 2 with (A5) waved, were constructed in [21].
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